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Abstract
This paper explores the behavior of a decision maker (DM) who is unaware of some of the options
available to her. The DM has a preference over consumption alternatives that is informed by
her epistemic state: what she knows and what she is aware of. The main result is a characteri-
zation, via observable choice, of introspective unawareness—a DM who is both unaware of some
information and aware she is unaware. Under dynamic introspective unawareness, the DM is
unwilling to commit to future choices, even when given the flexibility to write a contingent plan
that executes a choice conditional on the realization of uncertain events. This is a behavior that
cannot be explained by uncertainty alone (i.e., without appealing to unawareness). In a simple
strategic environment, the acknowledgment of unawareness can lead to strategic concealment of
choice objects (i.e., actions), in turn, leading to a desire for incomplete contracts.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the behavior (i.e, observable actions) of a decision maker (DM) who is unaware of
some of the options available to her. Due to the consideration of observability, the primary interest is in
the DM’s preferences (hypothetically embodied by choice data) and how patterns in preference change in
response to the structure of awareness. I argue, unawareness produces distinct patterns, and so, attempting
to model unawareness with uncertainty, regardless of how complex, will fail. As an example of when such
issues arise and how they might alter predictions, I consider a simple contracting environment. I show that
when unawareness is taken into account, players can have an incentive to conceal mutually beneficial actions.
To highlight the distinction between uncertainty and unawareness, consider Hal, who will buy a new
smartphone in six months. He will have three options at the time of purchase: x, y, and z. Hal might
not know which phone he would most like to purchase six months from now. This uncertainty could arise
because he does not know the technical specifications of the phones, their price, etc., and his true preference
depends on the realization of these variables. Contrast this to the case where Hal has never heard of phone
z. Here, he is unaware of z, and so naturally, of any preferences there regarding. Importantly, if Hal is
unaware of a piece of information (the existence of phone z), he is unable to make any choice based directly
on this information.
More subtle, but just as fundamental, is our acknowledgement of our own unawareness. Indeed, most
people would readily admit they cannot conceive of all future technologies or trends, or exhaustively list the
set of choices to be confronted in the upcoming week. This recognition of unawareness is important because
it suggests that the things a DM is unaware of may play an indirect role in her decision making, even if they
cannot be directly acted upon. Central to the analysis, then, is the DM who is (1) unaware and (2) aware
she is unaware. A DM in such an epistemic state is referred to as introspectively unaware. By contrast, a
DM who does not satisfy the second criterion would be referred to as naively unaware. In the presence of
introspective unawareness, Hal might envision a world in which he prefers something to x and y; of course,
he cannot know this something is z, as that would require him to be aware of z.
Under either uncertainty or introspective unawareness, Hal has a natural inclination to delay making
his choice: if he cannot start using the phone for six months, he might as well wait until then to choose.
However, the motivation for delay is different under the different types of ignorance. Under uncertainty, he
would like to wait so as to make a decision based on the realization of the relevant variables (for example,
the price of the phones). Under introspective unawareness, he would like to wait in case he becomes aware
of something better than whatever he would have chosen today. If Hal had been naively unaware, he would
have had no reason to delay; he would not consider the possibility of becoming aware of new information.
Hal is going to get his mother, Avril, to purchase the phone on his behalf, and has to instruct her today
about which phone to purchase in six months. If Hal is either uncertain or introspectively unaware of his
preference, it will not be optimal for him to specify any single phone. In the case of uncertainty, however,
he could leave detailed instructions that would carry out his optimal choice: in the event the prices are
p$x, $y, $zq, purchase phone x, ... etc. A commitment to consume (in the future) a particular alternative
given the state of affairs is referred to as a contingent plan. If Hal’s optimal decision depends only on
the realization of some variables, it is enough to specify a contingent plan that depends on said variables.
Contrast this to the case in which Hal is introspectively unaware. He cannot articulate any plan he is sure
will carry out his optimal decision. This is because he would need to describe objects he is currently unaware
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of and to include such information in a contingent plan would require he is aware of it.
The main results of this paper show that the observable criterion for introspective unawareness is a strict
preference for delaying choices at a positive cost rather than committing to a contingent plan, even when
any plan is available. In particular:
(‹1) When the DM is fully aware, she is always willing to commit to some contingent plan.
(‹2) Without full awareness, the DM might prefer costly delay to every contingent plan.
(‹3) If the DM is unwilling to commit to any contingent plan, then she must be introspectively
unaware.
So a preference for costly delay that cannot be appeased by the appeal to contingent planning is the behavioral
indication—in an exact sense—of introspective unawareness. The intuition is exactly as in the above example:
the DM’s language is not rich enough to specify the optimal contingent plan (unawareness), but is rich enough
that she knows this fact (awareness of unawareness). Because the DM is not aware of what she is unaware
of, the strength of the her aversion to commitment to a contingent plan is purely subjective. This can lead
to behavior, particularly in strategic environments, that is substantially different than what is predicted by
standard models.
After buying him his phone, Avril wants to hire Hal to write a computer program over his summer break.
If Hal does not accept the offer, he could spend the summer working on developing his own app. Hal, being
introspectively unaware, knows he does not fully understand what he could accomplish on his own. So, when
contemplating a contract, he will weigh the benefit against his subjective assessment of this outside option.
The best language for Avril’s job depends on the soon to be realized state s1 or s2. Hal is currently only
aware of the programing languages: c++ (which is better if state s1 is realized) and java (better if state s2
is realized). Hal, after thinking about what kind of app he could design with his current skill set, will accept
the contract c “ rc++, javas in which he writes the program for Avril, using c++ if state 1 is realized and
java in state 2 is realized.
In state s2, haskell is truly the best language and Avril knows this. She believes, however, that were
Hal to become aware of haskell, he would begin to investigate purely functional programming. This
would draw his attention to the paucity of his awareness, and ultimately lead him to increase his subjective
assessment of the outside option. In other words, by expanding his awareness a little, Hal becomes more
averse to commitment, because he now believes there are many great possibilities that he might shortly
become aware of. Therefore, it is possible that although cˆ “ rc++,haskells is a strict improvement over
c for both parties, it will be rejected; although the use of haskell is mutually beneficial, its existence will
be concealed.
1.1 Decision Theory, Logic, and Unawareness
Directly incorporating unawareness into a decision theoretic model introduces subtleties that need to be
dealt with judiciously. First, one must take care to ensure the process of eliciting preferences from a DM
does not affect her preferences. While asking a DM to rank risky prospects ostensibly does not affect her
risk preference, asking her to contemplate objects of which she was formerly unaware would most certainly
affect her awareness. Second, the type of unawareness considered (e.g., naive or introspective, object-based
or state-based, etc.) must be rich enough to produce observable patterns, even when keeping in mind the
pervious concern. Finally, Modica and Rustichini (1994); Dekel et al. (1998) show that within the context
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of state space models, simply assuming that the DM is unaware of certain states (while retaining desirable
properties of knowledge) is insufficient: the DM will either be fully aware or fully unaware.
To overcome these obstacles, I predicate my analysis on an epistemic modal logic with quantification
(ranging over objects), based on a set of logical statements that include a formal description of the DM’s
preference, and adapted from Board and Chung (2011). Each state of the world is defined by a set of
statements which are true: statements that directly regarding the relation between objects (e.g., “x costs
more than y” or “all objects are yellow or blue”) and include how the DM ranks objects (e.g., “x is preferred
to y”). In addition, there are statements describing the DM’s epistemic state: what the DM implicitly knows
(e.g., “the DM implicitly knows ‘x is preferred to y’ ”) and which objects the DM is aware of (e.g., “the
DM is aware of x”). The intersection of implicit knowledge and awareness is explicit knowledge. Implicit
knowledge can be thought of as idealized knowledge—what the DM would know if she was fully aware and
logically omniscient. In contrast, explicit knowledge can be thought of as working knowledge, subject to the
DM’s cognitive limitation of awareness.
The reason to consider a first order logic, rather than either a propositional logic (as in Fagin and Halpern
(1988)) or generalized state space models (as in Heifetz et al. (2006, 2008)) is to allow for introspection. The
DM displays an aversion to commitment because she anticipates the expansion of her awareness, and thus,
the logic must be able to capture reasoning about unawareness. Without quantification we run into problems:
the statement “I know I am unaware of a quantum computer,” while expressible, is inconsistent with the
intuitive notion of awareness and is generally precluded axiomatically.1 This problem can be circumvented
by appealing to quantification: “I believe there exists something I am unaware of” is both expressible and
intuitive.
1.2 Observability and Unawareness
If a modeler were to ask a person on the street, or a subject in the laboratory, to choose between phone x
and phone y, it is unreasonable to believe, at the time of her answer, that she is unaware of either x or y. The
very act of asking forces the DM’s hand.2 This issue is exacerbated in the identification of introspection: any
question regarding even the existence of unforeseen objects has the potential to change the DM’s epistemic
state.
Such issues are dealt with by relaxing what is meant by the revealed preference approach. Instead of
providing the DM with a set and asking her to indicate her preferences thereover, the modeler asks the DM
to provide both the relevant alternatives and her assessment of them. Elicitation can be incentivized as
follows. Ask the DM for a contingent plan, c, and the dollar amount, δ, required for the DM to commit to
the plan. Then a BDM mechanism (Marschak et al., 1964) is run as follows: a number, d P r0,8q, is drawn
from a known distribution. If d ă δ the DM is not committed and delays her choice until some pre-specified
time; if d ě δ the DM’s receives $d and her future consumption is implemented using the reported contingent
plan. Given a contingent plan c, it is clearly incentive compatible to report the true cost of delay. Moreover,
1Knowldge here should be interpreted as explicit knowledge. Such a statement violates KU introspection Dekel et al. (1998);
Heifetz et al. (2008) and closure under subformulae Fagin and Halpern (1988). It is an important and open question as to if
and how introspection can be incorporated into state space models.
2As pointed out by a referee, the issue may be partially skirted if the consumption objects are subjective acts, interpreted as
a label for a function that maps subjective states of the DM to consequences. This is the route taken by Minardi and Savochkin
(2017); Kochov (2015). However, this modeling choice creates as many issues as it resolves: it necessarily assumes that either
(i) the modeler does not himself understand the objective alternatives to which the label refer, in which case any identification
is filtered through the lens of modeler’s subjective world view, or (ii) the modeler fully understands the mapping between labels
and objective alternatives, in which case nothing can be identified in DMs who are more aware than the modeler.
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if c is preferred to c1, (so that δ ă δ1), it is similarly incentive compatible to report pc, δq rather than pc1, δ1q.
As such, if there exists a contingent plan to which the DM is willing to commit, she will report it with a
corresponding δ “ 0.
A crucial aspect to the identification of unawareness contained in this paper is that it never requires
the DM to contemplate objects she herself could not have conceived; it suffices for the modeler to consider
the DM’s preference over the set of objects she herself reported. The main contribution of this paper is,
therefore, the assertion of a framework that characterizes introspective unawareness from choices regarding
only information of which the DM is aware. Moreover, this approach works irrespective of the modeler’s
awareness or conception of the objective set of alternatives.
1.3 Organization
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the logical underpinnings of the decision
theory and expounds upon the choice patterns based on static preference. The main results are contained
in Section 3, which introduces contingent plans and the notions of acceptability. Section 4 explores a simple
strategic contracting game. A survey of the relevant literature can be found in Section 5. Appendix A
discusses the connection to subjective state space models and a preference for flexibility. Additional results
and proofs omitted from the text are contained in the appendix.
2 Logical Foundations: Preferential Logic
This section outlines the formal construction of the logic used in this paper. First Section 2.1 provides
the syntax for well defined formulae. That is, a purely mechanical account of which strings of characters will
be well defined. Then Section 2.2 endows well defined formulae with meaning by providing a semantic inter-
pretation: possible worlds semantics adapted to consider preferential statements and awareness structures.
Finally, section 2.3, considers an axiomatization (a method of deriving new true statements from old ones)
corresponding to the semantic models.
2.1 Syntax
Preferential choices will be described directly by an epistemic logic. To this end, for each n ě 1, define
a(n at most countable) set of n place predicates denoted by α, β, γ, . . .. Assume the existence of a countably
infinite set of variables denoted by X “ a, b, c . . .. Then, any n place predicate followed by n variables is a
well formed atomic formula. That is, if α is a 2 place predicate, then αab is a well formed atomic formula,
with the interpretation that a and b stand in the α relation to one another. For example, if α is “greater
than”, then αab states that a is greater than b.
There are two distinguished predicates. The first, a binary predicate ě, represents weak preference
(where paě bq is used rather than pěabq). The second, a unary predicate, E, denotes existence. Semantically,
variables will range over a set of consumption alternatives. Importantly, the set consumption alternatives is
itself a component of the world, and therefore, will be allowed to be different in different situations. Hence,
Epaq postulates that in the true state of affairs, a exists. In addition, this language allows for universal
quantification, @: @apbě aq states that b is preferred to all a. Take note that variables are placeholders, and,
until endowed with an interpretation, do not refer to any specific object.
There are also three (time indexed) modalities. Lt, At and Kt for t P t0, 1u. Given a well formed formula
ϕ (defined below), the interpretation of the modal operators is as in Fagin and Halpern (1988). Lt is implicit
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knowledge at time t; an agent implicitly knows ϕ, denoted Ltϕ, if ϕ is true in every state of affairs she
considers possible (at time t). At is awareness at time t; Atϕ is interpreted as the DM is aware of ϕ at
time t. Lastly, Kt is explicit knowledge—the conjunction of Lt and At. The DM explicitly knows ϕ if she
implicitly knows it and is aware of it: Ltϕ^Atϕ.
Define the set of well formed formulae recursively: for any well formed formulae, ϕ and ψ,  ϕ, ϕ ^ ψ,
@aϕ, Ltϕ, Atϕ and Ktϕ are also well formed. The resulting language is L.
Taking the standard shorthand, ϕ_ ψ is short for  p ϕ^ ψq, ϕ ùñ ψ is short for  ϕ_ ψ, and Daϕ
is short for  @a ϕ. In addition, let Pt denote  Kt , with the intended interpretation of Ptϕ as the DM
considers ϕ possible; she does not explicitly know it is not the case. Per usual, an occurrence of a variable
a is free in a formula ϕ if a is not under the scope of a quantifier, and is bound otherwise. A formula with
no free occurrences is called a sentence.
2.2 Semantics
For a given language, L, each DM is characterized by the tuple
M “ xS,X, tXsusPS ,V, tRtut“0,1, tAtut“0,1, tususPSy.
M is referred to as a model (or, a model of decision making). S “ ts, s1, . . .u is a non-empty set of states of
the world. X denotes a non-empty denumerable domain of the individual variables, the set of all possible
values a variable might take. Elements of X are referred to using x, y, z . . .. Xs Ď X is a non-empty subset
of consumption alternatives which exist in state s.3 Truth values of atomic formulae will be assigned by V,
a function that assigns to each n place predicate and state of the world s, a class of n-tuples from X. If
px1 . . . xnq P Vpα, sq, with x1 . . . xn P X, then αx1 . . . xn is true in that model in state s. tRtut“0,1 is an of
accessibility relations on S for each time period; the interpretation of Rtpsq “ ts1|sRs1u is the states the DM
considers possible when the true state is s. Atpsq Ď X is a (possibly-empty) set of objects which the DM is
aware of at time t in state s. Finally, us : X Ñ R is a utility representation of DM’s true preference over X
in state s.
Let M be the class of all models based on L. Let MBND denote the subclass of models in which
us|Xs : Xs Ñ R is a bounded function which attains its supremum for each s P S.
The truth of a particular formula depends on the assignment of the free variables in that formula. Let
an assignment be a function from the set of individual variables into objects: µ : X Ñ X. If µ and µ1 are
assignments that differ only in the object assigned to a then they are referred to as a-variants, and related
by µ „a µ1. Then a DM, M , is represented semantically via the operator |ù, recursively, as
3I work with a varying domain model. A word should be said on this, as there is considerable philosophical debate regarding
constant/varying domains. On one hand, it simplifies matters considerably to assume the same objects hypothetically exist in
each possible world. One the other, the very intention that possible worlds be distinct means they might be defined by different
objects. Here, I adopt the later view. This modeling choice allows for the possibility that a DM who is fully aware (aware of all
existing objects) is nonetheless uncertain she is fully aware. For a lengthier discussion on constant v. varying domains within
the context of unawareness, see Board and Chung (2011); Halpern and Reˆgo (2013).
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pM, sq |ùµ Epaq iff µpaq P Xs,
pM, sq |ùµ paě bq iff uspµpaqq ě uspµpbqq,
pM, sq |ùµ αa1 . . . an iff pµpa1q . . . µpanqq P Vpα, sq,
pM, sq |ùµ  ϕ iff not pM, sq |ùµ ϕ,
pM, sq |ùµ pϕ^ ψq iff pM, sq |ùµ ϕ and pM, sq |ùµ ψ,
pM, sq |ùµ @aϕ iff for all µ1 „a µ1 with µ1paq P Xs, pM, sq |ùµ1 ϕ
pM, sq |ùµ Ltϕ iff for all s1 P Rtpsq, pM, s1q |ùµ ϕ,
pM, sq |ùµ Atϕ iff µpxq P Atpsq for all a free in ϕ,
pM, sq |ùµ Ktϕ iff pM, sq |ùµ Ltϕ and pM, sq |ùµ Atϕ.
A formula ϕ is satisfiable if there exists a M , and a state thereof, s, and an assignment µ, such that
pM, sq |ùµ ϕ. If pM, sq |ùµ ϕ for every assignment µ, write pM, sq |ù ϕ. Given a DM, M , ϕ is valid in M ,
denoted as M |ù ϕ, if pM, sq |ù ϕ for all s. Likewise, for some class of DMs, N , ϕ is valid in N , denoted as
N |ù ϕ, if N |ù ϕ for all N P N . Finally, ϕ is valid (i.e., without qualification) if M |ù ϕ, for all models M .
2.3 Axioms
Board and Chung show that the AWARE axiom system (presented in Appendix B) is a sound and com-
plete axiomatization of the semantic structure introduced in section 2.2 (without the inclusion of preferential
element statements).4
The semantics of preferential statements require two additional axioms positing the completeness and
transitivity of preferences.
[Cmp] @a@b` paě bq ùñ pbě aq˘.
[Trv] @a@b@c`paě bq ^ pbě cq ùñ paě cq˘.
[Bnd] Da@bpa ě bq.
Because the set of consumption alternatives is assumed to be denumerable, completeness and transitivity
suffice to ensure the existence of a representation. Bnd axiomatically imposes the existence of maximal
elements. This will ensure, later, that a DM’s unwillingness to commit to an action is because optimal
decision do not exist. Bnd is valid in all finite models.
Proposition 2.1. AWARE Y Cmp Y Trv (resp. YBnd) is a sound and complete axiomatization of L
with respect to M (resp. MBND).
Proof. In appendix D. 
4Given an axiom system AX, and a language L, we say that the formula ϕ P L is a theorem of AX is it is an axiom of
AX or derivable from previous theorems using rules of inference contained in AX. Further, AX is said to be sound, for the
language L with respect to a class of structures N if every theorem of AX is valid in N . Conversely, AX is said to be complete,
for the language L with respect to a class of structures N if every valid formula in N is a theorem of AX.
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2.4 The Structure of Knowledge and Awareness
Further axioms can impose structure on the DMs knowledge and awareness, and hence, semantically, on
the accessibility relations and awareness sets. Consider the following:
[T] Ltϕ ùñ ϕ.
[4] Ltϕ ùñ LtLtϕ.
[5]  Ltϕ ùñ Lt Ltϕ.
[LE] Epaq ùñ L1Epaq.
[LÒ] L0ϕ ùñ L1ϕ.
[AÒ] A0ϕ ùñ A1ϕ.
It is well known, in the presence of of a base axiom system, T, 4, and 5 correspond to the class of models
where Rt is reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean,
5 respectively (see Fagin et al. (1995) for the propositional
case and Hughes and Cresswell (1996) for a first order treatment). Of note is the system S5 “ pAWAREY
TY4Y5q, corresponding to the class of models where Rt is an equivalence relation, and therefore, partitions
the state space.
Axiom LE states that by time 1 the DM implicitly knows which alternatives are feasible. Because
the model tacitly assumes that all consumption takes place at time 1, this requirement is tantamount to
assuming that, at the time of consumption, the DM implicitly knows all feasible alternatives. While included
for technical reasons,6 this dictate has little conceptual bite, since existence could be modeled as the subset
of objects about which the DM could feasibly choose at time 1. Axioms LÒ and AÒ state that the DM’s
ignorance is diminishing. The first stipulates, semantically, that R1 Ď R0: the set of states the DM considers
possible gets smaller over time. In the presence of S5 this means that the DM’s period 1 partition of the
state space is a (weak) refinement of her period 0 partition. The second requires that A0 Ď A1: the DM
becomes aware of more objects over time.
Proposition 2.2. S5 Y LE Y LÒ Y AÒ is a sound and complete axiomatization of L with respect to the
subclass of models such that R1 Ď R0 and A0 Ď A1 and Xs is constant on the partition defined by R1
(denoted MLRN ).
Proof. In appendix D. 
It is immediate that LÒ and AÒ imply that the DM’s explicit knowledge is increasing over time. Notice,
the converse is not true. Increasing explicit preference does imply increasing awareness (which can be seen
by examining knowledge of statements Epaq _  Epaq, which the DM alway implicitly knows). However, is
possible that the DM’s implicit knowledge diminishes even as her explicit knowledge grows. This is possible
if she stops being able to distinguish between worlds which differ only regarding statements she is unaware
of (at both time 0 and time 1), thereby not changing her explicit preference at all.
Let AW‹ “ S5 YCmp YTrv Y Bnd Y LÒ YAÒ Y LE, and let M‹ denote the corresponding class of
models. The remainder of the paper will consider only models of M‹.
2.5 Epistemic Preferences
Preferential axioms play the role of traditionally decision theoretic restrictions (i.e., completeness, transi-
tivity, etc); any (satisfiable) theory including these restrictions will have a model of decision making adhering
5Recall, a relation is Euclidian if xRy and xRz imply yRz.
6To ensure that existence is a statement on which the DM can condition a contract.
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to the corresponding decision theoretic framework. The importance, therefore, of including preferential state-
ment in our logic is that it provides us a language to make a clean distinction between true preference (a
feature of the physical state) and the DM’s understanding of her preference (a feature of her epistemic state)
and to analyze interplay there between. Specifically, the distinction between some elementary (read, true)
preference and the preference the DM knows or is aware of.
The discrepancy between the DM’s “true” preferences, her implicitly known preferences, and, in the
presence of unawareness, her explicitly known preferences, can be made formal. To do this, define the
following three preference relations:
Definition 1. Let M P M‹ be a model of decision making and let s P S denote some state. For each
px, yq P X ˆX, let µx,y be an assignment such that µpaq “ x and µpbq “ y. Define the following relations
on X ˆX
xěs y if and only if pM, sq |ùµx,y paě bq,
xěLt,s y if and only if pM, sq |ùµx,y Ltpaě bq, and
xěKt,s y if and only if pM, sq |ùµx,y Ktpaě bq.
The following remark lends an equivalent, but purely semantic, definition of these three relations.
Remark 2.3. Let M PM‹. For each s P S:
1. xěs y if and only if uspxq ě uspyq,
2. xěLt,s y if and only if us1pxq ě us1pyq for all s1 P Rtpsq, and
3. xěLt,s y if and only if xěLt,s y and x, y P Atpsq.
The interpretation is as follows: if pM, sq |ùµ paě bq then in state s the DM prefers µpaq to µpbq. However,
she may not know this fact. Specifically, if pM, sq |ùµ paě bq ^  Ltpaě bq, then in state s at time t, the
does not (implicitly) know her preference. She considers some state in which her preference is reversed.
The preference relations ěLt,s represents the subset of the DM’s true preference which are invariant in all
states she considers possible. Further, it is possible that pM, sq |ùµ Ltpaě bq ^  Ktpaě bq, so that the DM
implicitly, but not explicitly, knows her preference. In this case, it must be that either µpaq or µpbq is not in
the DM’s awareness, Atpsq. While the implicit preferences (and, over Atpsq, her explicit preferences) inherit
reflexivity and transitivity, the same can not be said about completeness.7 Even if the DM explicitly knows
her preferences are complete, she might not know what her preference is.
7As stated, the DM’s explicit preference will be, in general, very incomplete. It is entirely possible, however, that the DM
completes her preferences via some across-state aggregation, for example by making probabilistic judgements. This footnote, as
well as footnotes 8 and 9, informally explore this line of reasoning, and argue that the main points of this paper are invariant to
such a modeling choice. For a given model, M , let SzA denote the quotient of S obtained by identifying states which differ only
on the truth values assigned to statements about objects outside of A, with rss being the equivalence class containing s. Let
Γs,t : RSzAtpsq Ñ R be a weakly increasing aggregator which (i) maps constant functions to their output (i.e, is non-trivial), (ii)
is invariant to the value of fpsq for any s such that rss X Rtpsq “ H (i.e., is unaffected by states which are known to not have
occurred) and (iii) is constant over the cells of the partition Rt (i.e., the DM implicitly knows how she is aggregating). One
such example: Γs,t is the expectation operator with respect to p P ∆pSq conditional on Rtpsq. Notice that for all x P Atpsq,
uspxq is SzAtpsq measurable, so that Γs˚,t :“ Γs,t ˝ px ÞÑ tuspxqusPSzAtpsqq is a well defined functional A ˆ SzA Ñ R. For a
given functional form of Γ, we consider the alternative model where DM’s working preferences are the order generated by Γs˚,t.
It is easy to see that such an order is a completion of ěKt,s.
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s s1
A0psq
R0
z ą x ą y z ą y ą x
˚z ą˚ x ą y ˚z ą˚ y ą x
 Kpxěyq^ Kpyěxq
Lpzěxq^ Kpzěxq
 Kpxěyq^ Kpyěxq
Lpzěxq^Kpzěxq
Figure 1: A visual representation of Example 1. Assessable states are linked by arrows. A statement is
implicitly known if it is true in every state linked by an arrow. Awareness structures are indicated by dotted
lines—if a statement is true but contains object the DM is unaware of, it is written in gray and delineated
with by ˚.
Example 1. There are two states of the world, S “ ts, s1u and three elements that can be consumed in
each state, X “ Xs “ Xs1 “ tx, y, zu. The preference relations in each state are given by us “ r1, 0, 2s and
us1 “ r0, 1, 2s and the accessibility relation is the trivial R0 “ S2. A0psq “ tx, yu and A0ps1q “ X. Then,
the implicit preferences (at both states) rank z above x and y, but cannot compare x and y and so, are not
complete. So, M |ùµ Lppaě bq_paě bqq^ Lpaě bq^ Lpbě aq, for any µ such that µpaq “ x and µpbq “ y.
Moreover, the explicit preference at state s is the restriction of implicit preference to x and y (and hence in
the minimal reflexive relation), while at state s1 it coincides with the implicit relation.
To be thoroughgoing, the following point needs to be made: I assume that only explicit preferences are
observable in any meaningful way. Indeed, the DM can only asses, and therefore only act in accordance with,
her explicit knowledge. As such, implicit preference is introduced only to act as a comparison to explicit
preference. When the DM is fully aware, the two relations coincide. Therefore, any pattern in preference
which systematically differs between ěLt,s and ěKt,s is indicative of unawareness. In other words, if we
find a domain in which unawareness implies that ěLt,s and ěKt,s will impart different behavior, then such
a behavior is an observable criterion for unawareness.
Remark 2.4. Let W be a denumerable set and ě Ď W ˆW . Then, the following are equivalent:
1. ě is a reflexive and transitive.
2. There exists a model, M PM‹ with W “ X, and a state, s, thereof, such that ě“ ěL0,s.
3. There exists a model, M PM‹ with W Ĺ X, and a state, s, thereof, such that ě“ ěK0,s.
Proof. rp1q ùñ p3qs: Since ě is a reflexive and transitive it admits a multi-utility representation U , (Evren
and Ok, 2011). Let S “ U and let us “ s for each s P S. Let A0ptq “ W Ĺ Xs “ X “ W Y tzu, for
some z R W . Let R0 “ S ˆ S. Then for all x, y P W , x ě y iff upxq ě upyq for all u P U iff us1pxq ě
us1pyq for all s1 P R0psq and x, y P A0ptq “ W . By Remark 2.3, this is iff xěK0,s y. rp3q ùñ p2qs: Let
xS,X, tXsusPS ,V, tRtut“0,1, tAtut“0,1, tususPSy, s P S, be the model and state prescribed by (3). Then it is
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easily check that xS,W, tXsXW usPS ,V|W , tRtut“0,1, tAtut“0,1, tus|W usPSy, s, will satisfy (2). rp2q ùñ p1qs:
By Remark 2.3, ě admits a multi-utility representation. By (Evren and Ok, 2011) it is a pre-order. 
The above result exposes the extent to which an outside observer can differentiate a DM who is unaware
of some of the available action from a DM who is fully aware. Remark 2.4 demonstrates that, without fixing
the underlying model (in particular, if the outside observer is not himself fully aware), the DM’s revealed
preferences are dually consistent with either epistemic condition. In other words, the structure of preference
does not change as awareness changes, even if the domain of the preference does. The remainder of this paper
qualifies this limitation, showing that the DMs preference over dynamic choices can reveal her unawareness.
3 Contingent Planning
Within the models of M‹, the DM becomes more informed over time—both her uncertainty and her
unawareness abate. Intuitively, anticipating either a reduction in uncertainty or in unawareness will lead to
a preference for delay. In the case of uncertainty, the DM would prefer to delay making a choice so that she
might condition her action on the information she expects to receive. Correspondingly, if the DM expects
to become aware of novel action, she would prefer to delay making a choice to allow her future self the
possibility of choosing an action of which she is currently unaware.
This section shows that by focusing on preference over contingent plans, the uncertainty-related preference
for delay can be completely eliminated without reducing any unawareness-related preference for delay. A
contingent plan is a commitment to a particular consumption alternative, the identity of which can depend
on aspects of the true world. Over such a domain, a preference for costly delay can arise only as a response
to unawareness, and is therefore an observable marker of unawareness, even if the underlying model is not
identified by the modeler.
Fix a model M , with a set of consumption alternatives X. First, we must extend the DM’s preferences,
in particular those embodied by ěK , to her preference over such dynamic objects. The mapping pϕ ÞÑ bqµ,
where ϕ P L, x P X , and µ : X Ñ X is the commitment to consume µpbq in period 1, if, in the true state
she explicitly knows ϕ is true and the prescribed consumption is feasible. In other words if pM, sq |ùµ K1ϕ.
This is a partial contingent plan, since it does not specify what happens in states where ϕ is not known.
There are three relevant outcomes at time 1: (i) ϕ is not explicitly known, so her commitment does not
bind, (ii) the commitment binds, µpbq exists, and she does not explicitly know any object she prefers to µpbq,
or, (iii) the commitment binds and either µpbq does not exist or she explicitly knows an object she prefers
to µpbq. So, the DM is willing to commit to pϕ ÞÑ bqµ if she believes (iii) will never occur.
Definition 2. Given a model M , a partial contingent plan, pϕ ÞÑ aqµ, is acceptable in state s if
pM, sq |ùµ K0
ˆ
K1ϕ ùñ
´
Epbq ^ @aP1
`
bě a
˘¯˙
(3.1)
Parsing this formula, a DM is finds that partial plan acceptable if she knows at time 0, that at time 1,
whenever she will explicitly know ϕ is true µpbq will be feasible and she will also consider it possible that
µpbq is preferred to any other element. In other words, she knows she will not know ϕ is true and an object
y is preferred to µpbq. Notice, if at time 0 she knows  ϕ then `K1ϕ ùñ pEpbq ^ @aP1pbě aqq˘ is always
true and the DM finds the partial contingent plan acceptable.
Stringing together partial contingent plans can produce a complete contingent plan, which dictates a
unique consumption in each state of the world.
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Definition 3. Fix M PM‹ and a state s P S. A contingent plan is a triple xΦ, c, µy, such that Φ a finite
subset of L, c : Φ Ñ X, and µ is an assignment, and such that for each s P S there exists an unique ϕ P Φ
such that pM, sq |ùµ K1ϕ.
With the model is fixed, contingent plans will often be written as pc: ΦÑX qµ with the understanding that
Φ meets the necessary requirements in M . A contingent plan is a collection of partial plans, and, because
it dictates a unique consumption in each state, the image of c partitions the state space. Since the relevant
statement in Φ must be known at time 1, such a partition is a coarsening of the time 1 accessibility relation.
Remark 3.1. Fix M PM‹, then pc: ΦÑX qµ is a contingent plan if and only if ts P S | pM, sq |ùµ K1ϕuϕPΦ
is a coarsening of R1.
Then intuition about when a DM would be willing to commit to such a plan extends from the case with
partial plans. A contingent plan is acceptable if it provides outcomes that are no worse than what could
have been selected by the DM had she waited until time 1 and then made a decision in accordance with her
time 1 explicit knowledge.
Definition 4. A contingent plan, pc: ΦÑX qµ, is acceptable to a DM, M , in state s, if
pM, sq |ùµ K0
ľ
ϕPΓ
ˆ
K1ϕ ùñ
´
Epcpϕqq ^ @aP1
`
cpϕqě a˘¯˙, (3.2)
with a R Impcq. It is unacceptable, if it is not acceptable.
The DM knows that had she waited, she would not know any outcome dominates the outcome prescribed
by the plan.8 The following remark shows that we could equivalently have begun with intuition regarding
the unacceptability of contingent plans, captured by a similar syntactic requirement:
Remark 3.2. Let M PM‹. Then for any contingent plan, pc: ΦÑX qµ, in each state, c is unacceptable if
and only if
pM, sq |ùµ P0
ł
ϕPΓ
ˆ
K1ϕ^
´
 Epcpϕqq _ DaK1
`
a ą cpϕq˘¯˙,
with a R Impcq.
Remark 3.2 follows straightforwardly from several applications of De Morgan’s Law, the duality of x@, Dy
and xK,P y, and, critically, on the fact that if ϕ and ψ are materially equivalent, and contain the same free
variables, then Ktϕ ðñ Ktψ. This last observation is a direct consequence of L for Lt and A3 for At.
There exists one potential issue when considering full awareness. It may be the DM is unaware of some
aspect of the contingent plan itself, and therefore could not make reasonable choices regarding it. The
following remark placates any such concern, showing that if a contingent plan is inarticulable, that is to say
lies outside the DM’s awareness, is always unacceptable.
8 Assume the DM has a probability distribution p P ∆pSq (as described in Footnote 7) and aggregates her preferences
according expected utility. Then, acceptability would be recast as
K0
ľ
ϕPΓ
ˆ
K1ϕ ùñ
´
Epcpϕqq ^ cpϕq P argmax Γ˚
¯˙
(3.3)
where Ktψ can be read as ppψ “ TRUE | Rtpsqq “ 1. Of course, (3.3) is not actually well defined because Γ˚ is a semantic
notion. Now if the DM places probability 0 on ϕ, she will also place probability 0 on K1ϕ and therefore the prescription cpϕq
does not affect acceptability. Hence, the existence of measure 0 events do not prohibit the DM from finding a contingent plan
acceptable, whereas unawareness does. Intuitively, the DM places positive probability on learning novel outcomes, and so, cares
about what happens in such an event.
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s s1 s2
R1
R0
x ą x1 „ x2
ϕ,ψ
x1 ą x „ x2
 ϕ,ψ
x2 ą x „ x1
 ϕ,ψ
K1ψ^DaK1pa ą x1 „ x2q
K1ϕ^@aP1pxě aq
K1ψ^DaK1pa ą xq
K1 ϕ^@aP1px2ě aq
K1ψ^DaK1pa ą xq
K1 ϕ^@aP1px1ě aq
P0
`
K1ψ^DaK1pa ą xq˘ K0 ŽΛ `K1λ ùñ@aP1pcpλqě aq˘ K0
Ž
Λ
`
K1λ ùñ
@aP1pcpλqě aq˘
Figure 2: A visual representation of Example 2. The statements in s indicate that any contract based on ψ
is not acceptable, while the statements in s1 and s2 related to the acceptability of the contract defined by
(3.4).
Remark 3.3. Let M PM‹ and pc: ΦÑX qµ be any contingent plan such that there exists a ϕ P Φ and an
b P X zA0psq, such that either b is free in ϕ or b “ cpϕq. Then pc: ΦÑX qµ is unacceptable in state s.
Remark 3.3 follows immediately from the fact that the variable b is free in expression (3.2), thereby
ensuring the DM is not aware of such an expression, and subsequently that she does not explicitly know it.
3.1 The Existence of Acceptable Contingent Plans
A plan is unacceptable if the DM believes it is possible that if she waits until time 1 she will know a
strictly better element than the one she is prescribed. Therefore, in the absence of unawareness, a contingent
plans is acceptable if and only if it reduces exposure to uncertainty exactly as much as waiting until time 1.
The following example (and especially the accompanying figure, 3) provides intuition as to how the formal,
syntactic definition of (un)acceptability is related to the DM’s exposure to uncertainty.
Example 2. There are three states of the world, S “ ts, s1, s2u and three elements that can be consumed in
each state, X “ Xs “ Xs1 “ tx, x1, x2u. The preference relations in each state are given by us “ r1, 0, 0s,
us1 “ r0, 1, 0s and us2 “ r0, 0, 1s. A0 “ A1 “ X (for all s P S). The accessibility relations are given by the
partitions R0 – tSu, and R1 – ttsuts1, s2uu.
Let µ be any assignment such that µpbq “ x, µpb1q “ x1, µpb2q “ x2. Let ϕ P L be such that, under µ, ϕ
is true only at states s. It is easy to verify that
c :
$&% ϕ ÞÑ b ϕ ÞÑ b1 (3.4)
is an acceptable contingent plan in every state. The same holds true if cp ϕq “ b2, but not cp ϕq “ b.
Contrastingly, if ψ “ ϕ_ ϕ then pψ ÞÑ bq, pψ ÞÑ b1q, and pψ ÞÑ b2q are all unacceptable contingent plans.
For a contingent plan to be deemed acceptable, two things must occur: first the set of formulae on which
it is based must be rich enough so that it could mimic any decision making process the DM could have
implemented without a contingent plan (i.e., by waiting until 1 and making a single decision). In example
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2, any contract based on the tautology ψ is unacceptable, because it does not let the DM capitalize on the
information she will receive by time 1. Second, the proscribed outcomes must not be dominated in the event
to which they are associated. Returning to the example again, this is why c was acceptable but would have
been unacceptable when cp ϕq “ b. When the DM explicitly knows that  ϕ has obtained—to wit, states
s1 and s2—µpbq is a dominated element.
Theorem 3.4. Let M P M‹ with a finite state space, S, and such that A0psq “ X for all s P S. Then,
there exists a contingent plan that is acceptable at every s P S.
Proof. In appendix E. 
Theorem 3.4 states that, when the DM is fully aware, an acceptable contingent plan always exists. In
other words, in the absence of limitations on the DM’s understanding of the world, she can always describe,
exhaustively, the conditional actions she will take in the future. This result should come as little surprise,
as it tacitly assumed in much economic formalism, from the elicitation of conditional preferences via Savage
acts to the use of ex-ante strategies in repeated games.
To further interpret Theorem 3.4, assume the DM is tasked with a decision between (i) designing a
contingent plan which will act as a commitment device, or (ii) making a consumption choice at time 1, and
paying a cost δ. Because an acceptable contingent plan mimetically implements the DM’s future choices,
the DM who can report an acceptable plan has no desire to delay her choice and would thus report a value
of δ “ 0. As such, a DM who is fully aware, and who can commit to any contingent plan, will not have a
desire to delay.
The above line of reasoning relies on the dictate that the DM explicitly knows what it is she might learn.
In other words, while a contingent plan allows the DM to specify consumption in the event she learns a
particular piece of information, it is requisite she knows (at time the contingent plan is written) every piece
of information she might learn. This is markedly impossible in the event she is unaware, and aware of her
unawareness! This is, finally, the behavioral implication of unawareness: the unwillingness to commit to any
contingent plan, even under circumstances that make implicit knowledge very well behaved.
The following example shows even under very well behaved inplicit knowledge, the existence of unaware-
ness can render every contingent plan unacceptable.
Remark 3.5. There exist models of M‹, and a state s P S, such every contingent plan is unacceptable at s.
Proof. Example 3. 
Example 3. Let S contain two states, s and s1, which the DM can distinguish only in period 1. Let
Xs “ tx, yu, Xs1 “ X “ tx, y, zu, with us “ us1 “ r0, 1, 2s. Atpsq “ Xs and Atps1q “ Xs1 for t “ 0, 1.
Let pc: ΦÑX qµ be any contingent plan. Let ϕ be the unique statement that holds at s1. For acceptability,
it must be that pM, sq |ùµ @aP1
`
cpϕqě a˘, which is true if and only if cpϕq “ z. However, by remark 3.3, c
is then unacceptable.
Example 3 shows that once unawareness is introduced, there is no longer a guarantee of acceptability.9
The introduction of unawareness has fundamentally changed the behavior of the DM—creating a preference
9 To conclude the discussion from Footnotes 7 and 8, notice that, for any ordering Γs˚,t the alternative notion of acceptability
given by(3.3) is strictly stronger than definition in the body of this paper. Therefore, the failure of existence show by Theorem
3.5 persists even when the DM’s “explicit” preferences are complete. Finally, notice also, Theorem 3.4 would still hold under
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s s1
A0psq
R0
R1
y ą x
 ϕ
z ą y ą x
ϕ
 ϕ ùñ @aP1pyě aq ϕ ùñ D@aP1pzě aqϕ^ DaK1paě yq
 ϕ ùñ @aP1pyě aq
˚ϕ ùñ @aP1pzě aq˚
ϕ^ DaK1paě yq
P0
Ž
Λ
`
λ^DaK1pa ą cpλqq˘
Figure 3: A visual representation of Example 2.
for delay that cannot be assuaged by allowing the DM to make conditional decisions. And, by Proposition
3.4, this behavior, unlike incompleteness or a preference for flexibility, cannot be explained in a framework
with full awareness, no matter how much uncertainty exists. It is a behavioral trait that indicates the
presence of unawareness.
A qualification: the DM in Example 3 is not technically fully aware, she is aware of all extant objects.
However, even though the DM is aware of every feasible alternative she does not know this fact. The DM
believes she might learn about new objects—to which, owing to linguistic constraints, she cannot currently
commit—and is therefore disinclined towards commitment. Thus, the possibility of unawareness is sufficient
to engender a preference for delay. The next result shows it is also necessary.
Theorem 3.6. Let M P M‹ with a finite state space. If M admits contingent plans, and the DM finds
every contingent plan is unacceptable at state s, then the DM explicitly knows it is possible she is unaware.
Specifically,
pM, sq |ù K0P0 pDa p A0Epaqqq .
Proof. In appendix E. 
A DM cannot be so unaware she is not even aware waiting will afford her a more complete world view.
That is, the DM must be introspectively unaware. The intuition of this result is straightforward. The DM,
acting on explicit knowledge, must explicitly know all contingent plans are unacceptable and this requires
she is aware she will have more choices if she does not commit.
4 Unawareness and Contracts
This section contains a simple example to show how the framework presented above could be used
in applications. Assume there are two players: a Principal (player p), who is offering a take-it-or-leave-
it contract to an Agent (player a). The model takes place in an interactive awareness structure in which
the more restrictive definition: since Γ‹s,1 is constant across R1psq, the DM can choose cpϕq to be Γ‹s,1 maximal in the event
that ϕ obtains. It is in this sense that I mean the main results are agnostic to whether the DM’s actions are in accordance with
her explicit preferences or a completion of them.
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players’ knowledge and awareness are defined over atomic statements and both their own and their opponents
knowledge and awareness.10 It is in this framework that I will show the Principal has an incentive to
conceal mutually beneficial information. The intuition being that, although certain novel actions are Pareto
improving in every ex-post scenario, the Agent will react to the discovery of novel actions by becoming
more sensitive to her own unawareness, hence increasing her aversion to commitment. In other words, the
display of surprising outcomes indicates to the Agent that the novel outcomes are more valuable than she
previously thought; the added value to waiting (and taking an outside option) is greater than the value added
by the novel outcome itself. Further, I will show that this incentive can naturally lead to the optimality of
incomplete contracts.
The timing is as follows. In period 0, the Principal offers the Agent a continent plan to be executed in
period 1 and some monetary transfer, m : S Ñ R; to make matters as simple as possible, the transfer is in
utility terms and and the contingent plan is a function from S to X.11 If the offer is rejected the the Agent
can take an outside offer, some action in X. When the Agent accepts a contract, c, then her state contingent
utility is us,apcpsqq `mpsq and the Principal’s is us,ppcpsqq ´mpsq. If the contract is rejected, the Principal
receives a utility of 0.
Of course, to make our problem well defined, we also have quantify the Agent’s perceived value of
the outside option. In the case of full awareness (or, naive unawareness, as in Auster (2013)), the Agent
would have a well defined understanding over the outside option. This is not the case with introspective
unawareness, as the Agent is aware of the possibility that waiting will afford novel actions. So consider a
mapping δ : 2X Ñ RS with the restriction that
δpAqpsq ě max
xPXXAus,ipxq, (4.1)
In light of the results in section 3, I further restrict that (4.1) holds with equality if the Agent is fully aware
or naively unaware. δ captures the DM’s attitude towards unawareness, her perceived value to the objects
that she is currently unaware of (also, implicitly, the likelihood of discovering these novel actions in different
states). Keeping in line with the formal model, I do not take a stand on how the Agent aggregates across
states. Still, we can assume that it is individually rational for each DM to accept any acceptable contract
(i.e., one that weakly dominates the outside option) and reject any unacceptable contract. What makes this
problem distinct from the classical contracting problem (even one with indescribable states/alternatives) is
that the Principal, though offering a contract, has the ability to alter the Agent’s awareness.
4.1 The Principal’s Problem
I focus on the case where actions are verifiable and the Principal is a standard economic DM: a fully aware
expected value maximizer. As such, the Principal’s problem is simply to offer the acceptable contract that
maximizes his expected payoff. That is, maximize his payoff subject to a participation constraint on behalf
of the Agent. Moreover, we will assume the Agent explicitly knows the Principal is fully aware. However,
and unlike prior application of awareness, the Agent is introspectively unaware.
Let S “ ts1, s2u and X “ tx, y, z, wu. Assume that neither player implicitly knows the state in period
0 (and that the Principal believes the states are equally likely), but both will know the state in period 1.
Assume utilities are given by,
10It is clear that the same axiomatization will suffice, simply by adding additional indexes to the modalities.
11In this section, I assume Xs “ X for all s P S. This is inessential for all results/intuition, but expedient in saving on
notation.
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us,p us,a
x y z w x y z w
s1 4 1 3 0 s1 3 1 2 6
s2 1 3 4 6 s2 4 3 5 0
In period 0, let δpAq “ p3, 4q if z, w R A and δpAq “ p6, 5q otherwise. Consider the case where the Agent’s
initial awareness is A0,a “ tx, yu and, if left unperturbed by the Principal’s offer, it remains her awareness
in period 1. Alternatively, if the Principal offers the contract c, then the Agent’s awareness set becomes
A0,a “ tx, yu Y Impcq.
What is the Principal’s optimal strategy, given that he is constrained to offer complete contracts? Notice
that if he offers the contract xc‹ “ px, yq,m‹ “ p0, 1qy, it is accepted—the Agent is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting, given that her perception of the value of the outside option is also p3, 4q. The
Principal gets a utility of 12 p4 ´ 0q ` 12 p3 ´ 1q “ 3. It is easy to verify that this is the best the Principal
can do. To see this, note that if the Principal offers a contract containing either z or w, he must provide
the Agent with a utility of at least p6, 5q (the Agent’s new participation constraint). The best way for the
Principal provide this is, xc1 “ px, zq,m2 “ p3, 0qy. But this gives the Principal an expected utility of 52 ,
worse than xc‹,m‹y.
Nonetheless, the contract xc2 “ px, zq,m2 “ p0, 0qy makes both players strictly better off: c2 provides
state contingent utilities of p3, 5q and p4, 4q for the Agent and Principal, respectively. Hence, when the
Principal is constrained to offer a complete contract, he willingly conceals a Pareto improving action. The
intuition is simple: expanding the Agent’s awareness makes her more aware of her own awareness, and hence
she displays a larger aversion to commitment. This second effect outweighs the first, so the Principal chooses
not to disclose the actions.
Now, consider the case where the Principal can offer an incomplete contract. Such a contract does not
provide any alternative for a particular state, upon the realization of which the players renegotiate. Now
the Principal can offer the contract c “ px, ¨q (read: x in state 1, re-negotiate in state 2). This is acceptable
to the Agent, since δptx, yuqps1q “ 3 “ us1,apxq. In period 1, if state s2 is realized, the Principal offers the
new contract c “ z. This is again acceptable since δptx, y, zuqps2q “ 5 “ us2,apzq. Therefore by appealing to
incomplete contracts, the Principal can implement his unconstrained optimal contract.
One component obviously missing from this example is how the Agent’s perception of unawareness reacts
to the offer of an incomplete contract. It is reasonable to assume the agent believes when such a contract is
offered, it must be due to to strategic concerns relating to options outside if her current awareness. Hence
the offer of an incomplete contract is itself reason to change her perception of the value of delay. This
effect cannot be captured at all by naive unawareness, and highlights the importance of creating a richer
epistemic framework. However, because this behavior is complicated, and the agent’s shifting perception is
likely subject to equilibrium effects, I leave any formal analysis to future work.
It is worth briefly addressing the relation between this environment and previous work connecting aware-
ness with incomplete contracts. There is a large body of literature on incomplete contracts arising from the
indescribably of states, leading to the well known discussion of Maskin and Tirole (1999). They show show,
so long as players understand the utility consequences of states, indescribability should not matter. This
paper, on the other hand, allows the players to have asymmetric awareness regarding the set of actions that
can be taken. Because the Agent is not fully aware of the set of actions, simply offering a particular contract
16
might alter her awareness state, and therefore, her preferences.
The above example, while highly stylized, is indicative of a general phenomena. Although the effect of
unawareness can be quantified via δ, and delay can be calculated, unawareness introduces behavior that
intrinsically different than uncertainty. Unlike in the more standard framework, the value of delay (i.e., the
outside option) changes with the Agent’s epistemic state, and therefore is itself a function of the contract
being offered. As such, there may exist feasible contracts which are initially individually rational, but cease
to be so when offered. It is this effect, driven by introspective unawareness, that can make incompleteness
strictly beneficial.
Remark 4.1. Let xc‹,m‹y be a contract accepted in equilibrium. If there exists some xˆ P X such that
xˆ is strictly preferred to c‹psq in the same (non-empty) set of states for both players, then the Agent is
introspectively unaware.
Proof. We will show there exists some D Ď X and s P S such that δpDqpsq ą maxxPXXD u¯s,apxq. Since by
definition (4.1) holds with equality when the Agent is fully aware or naively unaware, this suffices to prove
the claim. Assume no such D existed. Let Sˆ denote the set of states where xˆ is strictly preferred to c‹psq.
Consider a new contract c, whose value equals c‹psq for all s except in Sˆ where cpsq “ xˆ.
We now claim that xc,m‹y would have been accepted and is preferred by the Principal to xc‹,m‹y. Indeed,
towards the first claim, notice by construction us,apcpsqq ě us,apc‹psqq for all s. Hence, we need only worry
about states such that δpA0,aY xˆqpsq ą δpA0,aqpsq. But, this, by our assumption of naivete´, can only happen
if δpA0,a Y xˆqpsq “ us,apxˆq, which only happens for s P Sˆ. Towards the second claim, notice by construction
it is also true that us,ppcpsqq ě us,ppc‹psqq for all s. 
Naive awareness can also induce the Principal to withhold Pareto improving contracts, so long as the
two players’ preferences are not aligned with regard to the novel outcome. The Principal may withhold
information strategically, as the novel outcomes may be of direct value as an outside option, making the
participation constraint harder to satisfy. This is similar in spirit to the arguments put forth in Filiz-Ozbay
(2012) and Auster (2013), where the agents are naively unaware.
5 Literature Review
This paper is within the context of two distinct, albeit related, literatures: that on epistemic logic and
unawareness, and that on unawareness and unforeseen contingencies in decision theory. Unawareness was
first formalized within modal logic by Fagin and Halpern (1988), who introduced the modal operator for
awareness, A, and explicit knowledge, K. This was extended later by Halpern and Reˆgo (2009) to include
quantified statements that allow for introspective unawareness, and extended further by Halpern and Reˆgo
(2013), to allow the agent to be uncertain about whether she has full awareness or not. Quantification,
in these logics, is ranges over formulae. Because the foremost concern is over the alternatives that can be
consumed, (and over which preferences can be defined), I make use of the logic introduced by Board and
Chung (2011) and Board et al. (2011), where awareness is based on objects and predicates rather than the
formulae themselves. Board and Chung (2011) was the first to point out that fixed domain semantics do not
allow the DM to be uncertain about whether she is fully aware.
In economics, state space models—the semantic structure that include states, and define knowledge and
unawareness as operators thereon, as in this paper—have been of particular interest. Modica and Rustichini
17
(1994) and Dekel et al. (1998) both provide beautiful, albeit negative, results in this domain. They show,
under mild conditions, unawareness must be in some sense trivial; the DM is either fully aware or fully
unaware. While Modica and Rustichini (1994) consider a specific awareness modality, Dekel et al. (1998)
show, under reasonable axioms, state-space models do not allow any non-trivial unawareness operator. As
stated, this would be a very damning result for this paper, as it would imply either ěK “ ěL or ěK “ H,
either way, not making for an interesting decision theory. This paper eschews the issue by disentangling
explicit and implicit knowledge. Considering these forms of knowledge separately avoids ever simultaneously
satisfying the necessary axioms for DLR’s negative result. A far more succinct and intuitive discussion than
I could hope to achieve is found in Section 4 of Halpern and Reˆgo (2013), and so, I refer the reader there.
Beyond the separation of implicit and explicit knowledge, there have been other approaches to the
formalization of unawareness that circumvent the problems outlined in the pervious paragraph. Modica
and Rustichini (1999) propose models in which the DM is aware only of a subset of formulae (necessarily
generated by primitive propositions), and entertains a subjective state space (a coarsening of the objective
state space) in which the DM cannot distinguish between any two states that differ only by the truth of a
proposition of which she is unaware. Heifetz et al. (2006) and Heifetz et al. (2008) consider a lattice of state
spaces that are ordered according to their expressiveness. In this way, unawareness is captured by events
that are not expressible from different spaces—events that are not contained in the event nor the negation of
the DM’s knowledge. Li (2009) also provides a model with multiple state spaces, where the DM entertains
a subjective state space (similar to the above papers, the set of possible state spaces forms a lattice). This
allows the DM to be unaware of events in finer state spaces, while having non-trivial knowledge in coarser
state spaces. It is an open problem as to how introspection can be incorporated into multi-state-space
models.
The decision theoretic take on unawareness is primarily based on a revealed preference framework, and
so, unlike its logical counterpart does not dictate the structure of awareness but rather tries to identify it
from observable behavior. The first account of this approach (and which predates the literature by a sizable
margin) is Kreps (1979). Kreps considers a DM who ranks menus of alternatives, and whose preferences
respect set inclusion. The motivation being larger menus provide the DM with the flexibility to make choices
after unforeseen contingencies. This interpretation, while not strictly ruled out by the model, is certainly
not its most obvious interpretation, especially in light of the titular representation theorem. That Krepsian
behavior can always be rationalized in a model without appealing to unawareness is shown formally in
Theorem A.1; a longer discussion in relation to this paper is found in Appendix A.
More recently there has been a growing interest in modeling the unaware DM. Kochov (2015) posits
a behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies. He considers the DM’s ranking over streams of acts
(functions from the state space to consumption). An event, E, is considered foreseen if all bets on E do not
distort otherwise prefect hedges. That is to say, an event is unforeseen if the DM cannot “properly forecast the
outcomes of an action” contingent on the event. Kochov shows the events a DM is aware of form a coarsening
of the modeler’s state space. In a similar vein, Minardi and Savochkin (2017) also contemplate a DM who has
a coarser view of the world than the modeler. This coarse perception manifests itself via imperfect updating;
the DM cannot “correctly” map the true event onto an event in her subjective state space. The events that
are inarticulable in the subjective language of the DM can be interpreted as unforeseen. However, in these
works, the objects of which the DM is supposedly unaware are encoded objectively into the alternatives she
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ranks. Because of this, I argue they are behavioral models of misinterpretation rather than unawareness.
Karni and Vierø (2016); Grant and Quiggin (2014) are more explicit about modeling unawareness, and,
along with their companion papers, are (to my knowledge) the only decision theoretic paper that deals with
unawareness of consumption alternatives, rather than contingencies. They examine a DM who evaluates
acts which may specify an alternative explicitly demarcated as “something the DM is unaware of,” and who
can be interpreted as possessing probabilistic belief regarding the likelihood of discovering such an outcome.
A key difference between this paper and the above papers, is that the latter require the modeler fully
understands the awareness structure of the DM, before proceeding the the analysis. Indeed, the construction
of primitives in each model rely exactly the set of outcomes (resp., events) about which the DM is aware
(resp., can fully describe)—conceivable acts (resp., describable conceivable states) in Karni and Vierø (2016)
and foreseen-contingencies (resp., surprise free acts) in Grant and Quiggin (2014). Further, the authors’
identification rely on significant structural assumptions (e.g., expected utility type tradeoffs) placed on the
DM’s preferences over acts that provide unforeseen outcomes—contrastingly, this paper does not require the
modeler to take a stand on the structure of preferences nor awareness (beyond that it does not diminish over
time).
Grant and Quiggin (2012) develop a model to deal with unawareness in games, founded on a modal logic
which incorporates unawareness in a similar way to Modica and Rustichini (1994). They show that while this
model is rich enough to provide non-trivial unawareness, it fails to allow for introspective unawareness, even
when first order quantification is permitted. (This limitation arises because of the desired interplay between
the structure of knowledge and the structure of awareness as facilitated by the game theoretic environment.)
By relaxing the connection with the modal underpinnings, they then consider possible heuristics that a player
might exhibit when she inductively reasons that she is introspectively unaware. In a companion paper, Grant
and Quiggin (2014) provide a (decision theoretic) axiomatization of such heuristics.
Morris (1996) works somewhat in the reverse direction of the current paper, providing a characterization
of different logical axioms (for example, L, T, 4, etc) in terms of preferences over bets on the state of
the world. Schipper (2014) extends this methodology to include unawareness structures as described in
Heifetz et al. (2006). In a similar set up, Schipper (2013) constructs an expected utility framework to elicit
(or reveal) a DM’s belief regarding the probability of events (when she might be aware of some events).
Schipper concludes, the behavioral indication of unawareness of event E is that the DM treats both E and
its complement as null. The idea that a DM might manifest choice objects via a formal language is not new.
Contingent plans, in this paper, share much with mapping between syntactic tests and savage acts in Blume
et al. (2009). In both constructs, the DM constructs conditional statements that, under a given semantic
interpretation, correspond to a savage act over a state space.
Finally, this characterization is of particular interest in relation to models of subjective learning. To
identify what a DM believes she might learn, axiomatizations (Ergin and Sarver, 2010; Riella, 2013; Dillen-
berger et al., 2014, 2015; Piermont et al., 2016; Piermont and Teper, 2017) often include the requirement
that any dynamic choice behavior is indifferent to some contingent plan—in essence, assuming the existence
of acceptable, and articulable, plans.12 As such, the results of this paper mandate that a theory of subjec-
tive learning under unawareness cannot be built on the same machinery. Put differently, current models of
12The first two references do not directly construct such plans; nonetheless, the interpretation of both papers concerns a DM
who constructs a contingent plan after observing the choice objects they receive.
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subjective learning necessarily reduce all learning to resolution of uncertainty rather than from the arrival
unanticipated information.
6 Conclusion
This paper contemplates a framework that separates a DM’s knowledge from her awareness, in such a
way that allows the DM to reason about her own ignorance. Within this environment, I assume the DM
has a ranking over consumption alternatives that is informed by her epistemic state (i.e., what she knows
and what she is aware of). The main result is a characterization of the effect of unawareness on observable
choice, and the provision of the requisite domain for identification. When the DM is introspectively unaware,
she will exhibit a preference for costly delay, even when given the flexibility write any contingent plan she
wishes.
One last point: In interpersonal contracting environments, where disputes might arise, the DM might not
be able to prove her explicit knowledge. Because the conditioning events of a contingent plan are generated
by the DM’s explicit knowledge, some contracts might not be enforceable, if the relevant events cannot be
externally verified. In this case, the DM might prefer to delay choices even when no unawareness is present.
While this might complicate identification in interpersonal environments, it also provides an interesting link
between two behaviors. When there is a fear that contracts will not be upheld by a court, it has the same
effect as introducing introspective unawareness: both situations prohibit the DM from writing a contract
that she explicitly knows will implement her future behavior (i.e., her behavior if there had been no contract).
Thus, viewed at a higher level, these two phenomena are the same. They both place constraints on which
types of contracts can be implemented, and therefore, both drive a wedge between the value of the optimal
(constrained) contract and the value of delaying choice.
A A Preference for Flexibility
One interpretation of Kreps (1979) is the anticipation of learning induces a preference for flexibility. That
is, the DM’s preference over menus (i.e, subsets of X), respects set inclusion: if m1 Ď m Ď X then m is
preferred to m1. A DM who expects to learn her true preference, but is currently uncertain, will prefer the
flexibility to make choices contingent on the information she learns. In this section, I will show that the
Krepsian framework can be faithfully reproduced as a special case of the general model outlined above. In
particular, this special case is one of full awareness; as such, the unforeseen contingencies interpretation is
not strictly needed, and a preference for flexibility is not alone the behavioral indication of unawareness.
Definition 5. A menu, m Ď X, s-dominates a menu, m1 Ď X, (at period t), if and only if
pM, sq |ùµ K0
ł
aPµ´1pmq
K1
ľ
bPµ´1pm1q
paě bq. (A.1)
for some surjective assignment µ. Further, m strictly s-dominates m1, if it dominates m1 and m1 does not
dominate m.
That is, m dominates m1 if the DM explicitly knows that irrespective of the state of affairs, she will choose
an alternative out of the menu m rather than m1. Of course, she does not need to know which element is
the maximal one. For example:
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Example 4. Let S “ ts, s1u and X “ Xs “ Xs1 “ tx, y, zu, with us “ r0, 1, 2s and us1 “ r2, 1, 0s. Let
R0 “ S2 and R1 “ tps, sq, ps1, s1qu and A “ X for both states and time periods. Notice, tx, zu strictly s-
dominates tyu. Indeed, pM, sq |ù K1pxě yq and pM ě s1q |ù K1pzě yq. So, M |ù K0pK1pxě yq_K1pzě yqq.
So, the DM knows, in the true state of affairs, either x or z is preferred to y, but does not know which
preference is her true preference.
The following result shows that beginning with the s-dominance relation, generated by some epistemic
model, and extending it to a weak order captures exactly the “preference for flexibility” described in Kreps
(1979). In fact, the converse it also true: every Krepsian DM can be formulated as the extension of an
s-dominance relation with respect to some epistemic model.
Theorem A.1. Let ě be a weak order over the non-empty subsets of X. The following are equivalent:
(i) ě satisfies Kreps’ axioms,
(ii) There exists an M P M‹ with us invariant over the partition induced by R1, Xs “ A0psq “ X for
all s P S and such that for some s1 P S we have m s1-dominates m1 implies m ě m1, and m strictly
s1-dominates m1 implies m ą m1.
Proof. In appendix E. 
Notice that the dominance relation, projected onto singleton menus, produces, xěKs,0 y if and only if
txu s-dominates tyu. Hence a preference for flexibility can be seen as a natural extension of multi-utility
models.
Notice there is a natural connection between acceptability and the dominance relation over menus. Intu-
itively, when the menu is thought of as the image of a contingent plan, then the contingent plan specifies how
the DM will choose out of the menu. Under this interpretation, Theorem A.2 the provides the connection
between having a well defined preference over menus and being willing to accept a contingent plan.
Remark A.2. Let M PM‹ satisfies the requirements of Theorem A.1 (ii) then a finite menu m Ď X is not
strictly s-dominated if and only if it is the image of an acceptable contingent plan, pc: Φ Ñ X qµ.
If a menu is undominated (according to the definition given by (A.1)), one must be able to construct an
acceptable contingent plan from it. In particular, such a menu must not be dominated by m “ X: for every
alternative, x P X, there is a corresponding element of m which will be known to be maximal. Conversely,
if a contingent plan is acceptable it specifies each alternative which will be explicitly known to be maximal,
and hence, the collection of all proscribed consumption alternatives must form an undominated menu.
As a final remark, notice that the epistemic model specified by A.1 is one of full awareness. It is this
observation that qualifies the Krepsian interpretation of flexibility as arising from unforeseen contingencies.
There is a bijective relationship between a class of models exhibiting full awareness and with preference
relations adhering to the Krepsian paradigm. To be clear, this is not to say a preference for flexibility cannot
arise from the anticipation of unforeseen contingencies, but rather, that a preference for flexibility is not
proof of the anticipation of unforeseen contingencies. Every Krepsian preference is wholly consistent with
an epistemic model in which the DM is both fully aware and fully rational (i.e., obeys the S5 axioms). This
caveat stands in contrast to the results of Section 3: the non-existence of an acceptable contingent plan is
not consistent with any epistemic model of full awareness.
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B The AWARE Axiom system
Two formulae ϕ and ψ are called bound alphabetic variants of one another if ϕ and ψ differ only because
where ϕ has well formed sub-formulae of the form @aζ where ψ has @bη and ζ has free occurrences of a in
exactly the same places as η has free occurrences of b. ϕra{bs denotes the formula created first by taking a
bound alphabetic variant of ϕ with no bound occurrences of b, and then replacing every free a with b.
The following axiom schemata,
[Prop] All substitution instances of valid formulae in propositional logic.
[E1] @aEpaq
[E2] @aϕ ùñ pEb ùñ ϕra{bsq
[E3] @apϕ ùñ ψq ùñ p@xϕ ùñ @xψq
[E4] ϕ ùñ @xϕ, provided x is not free in ϕ
[L] Ltpϕ ùñ ψq ùñ pLtϕ ùñ Ltψq
[A0] Ktϕ ðñ pLtϕ^Atϕq
[A1] Atϕ, provided ϕ is a sentence.
[A2] Atϕ^Atψ ùñ Atpϕ^ ψq
[A3] Atϕ ùñ Atψ, provided ϕ and ψ share the same free variables.
and inference rules,
[MP] From ϕ and pϕ ùñ ψq infer ψ.
[LN] From ϕ infer Ltϕ.
[UG] From ϕ infer @aϕ.
[UGL] From
ϕ1 ùñ Ltpϕ2 ùñ . . . ùñ Ltpϕh ùñ Ltψq . . .q,
where h ě 0, infer
ϕ1 ùñ Ltpϕ2 ùñ . . . ùñ Ltpϕh ùñ Lt@aψq . . .q,
provided that a is not free in ϕ1 . . . ϕh.
regarding the language L were first proposed by Board and Chung (2011). Refer to the above axiom system
as AWARE.
C Supporting Results
Lemma 1. Let Γ Ă L be a maximally consistent set of formulae containing Cmp Y Trv. For each a P X
define lpaq “ tb P X | paě bq P Γu. Then for any a, b P X either lpaq Ď lpbq or lpbq Ď lpaq.
Proof. Assume paě bq P Γ. So, let c P lpbq. By definition, pbě cq P Γ, and therefore so to is paě bq ^ pbě cq.
Then, since every instance of Trv P Γ, ppaě bq ^ pbě cq ùñ paě cqq P Γ, so by MP, paě cq P Γ, implying
c P lpaq and so lpbq Ď lpaq. Conversely, assume paě bq R Γ. Since Γ is maximally consistent,  paě bq P Γ.
Morevoer, since every instance of Cmp P Γ, ppaě bq _ pbě aqq P Γ. Hence, pbě aq P Γ. Appealing to the
argument above, we have that lpaq Ď lpbq. 
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Lemma 2. Fix a model M PM‹ with a finite state space, S, and a assignment µ. For each s set sL1 “
tλ P L|pM, sq |ùµ L1λu. Let „Lt be the equivalence relation on S defined by s „L1 s1 if sL1 “ s1L1 . Let
S{„Ltµ denote the resulting quotient space of S, with elements rss. Then, there exists a set Φ Ă L such that
h : rss ÞÑ tϕ P Φ | pM, sq |ùµ L1ϕu (C.1)
defines a bijection between S{„Lt and Φ.
Proof. Let M be such a model. Enumerate the elements of S{„L1 . The proof is by induction on the number
of elements in S{„L1 . If S{„L1 contains a single element, any single tautological statement provides such a
set, Φ.
Assume the result holds for n, with the corresponding set Φn “ tϕ1,n . . . ϕn,nu, and let S{„L1 contain
n` 1 elements. By definition of S{„L1 , it must be that for each rsis, i ď n, there exists some statement λi,
such that,
λi PsL1i zsL1n`1, or, (C.2)
λi PsL1n`1zsL1i . (C.3)
So, for each i ď n, define ψi “  Ltλi if (C.2) holds, and ψi “ Ltλi if (C.3) holds. Define,
ϕn`1,n`1 “
ľ
iďn
ψi,
ϕi,n`1 “ ϕi,n ^ L1ϕn`1,n`1,
for i ď n. We claim Φn`1 “ tϕ1,n`1 . . . ϕn`1,n`1u defines a bijection between S{„Lt and Φ defined by (C.1).
Towards surjectivity, let s P rsis. We claim pM, sq |ùµ L1ϕi,n`1. First, if k “ n` 1 then by construction
pM, sq |ùµ ψi for each i, and further each ψ is of the form L1λi or  L1λi. Either way, pM, sq |ùµ L1ψi
by the fact that R1 is an equivalence relation. The claim follows since |ù is closed under conjunction. If
k ‰ n` 1 then pM, sq |ùµ L1ϕi,n, by the inductive hypothesis. Further, by construction pM, sq |ùµ  ψi and
hence pM, sq |ùµ  ϕn`1,n`1. By the reflexivity of R1, this implies pM, sq |ùµ  L1ϕn`1,n`1.
To show injectivity, we will show that L1ϕn`1,n`1 ^ L1ϕi,n`1 is unsatisfiable for all i. This will prove
the claim since, appealing to the inductive construction, it implies L1ϕi,n`1 ^ L1ϕj,n`1 is never satisfiable.
Indeed, L1ϕi,n`1 ùñ L1 L1ϕn`1,n`1 ùñ  L1ϕn`1,n`1 (where the second implication comes from T). 
D Soundness and Completeness Results
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof of soundness of the AWARE axioms can be found in Board and
Chung (2011). For the remaining axioms, let M P M. Let µ be arbitrary. Assume pM, sq |ùµ  paě bq.
By definition uspµpaqq ğ uspµpbqq, and therefore uspµpbqq ą uspµpaqq, so, pM, sq |ùµ pbě aq: since µ was
arbitrary, Cmp is valid in M. So Cmp is sound with respect to M. Assume pM, sq |ùµ paě bq ^ pbě cq.
By definition, this implies uspµpaqq ě uspµpbqq and uspµpbqq ě uspµpcqq; by the transitivity of ě this implies
uspµpaqq ě uspµpcqq, so, pM, sq |ùµ paě cq. Since µ was arbitrary, Trv is sound with respect to M. Now
let M PMBND, and s P S. Then us|Xs attains its supremum, say at x¯. Then let µ be such that µpaq “ x¯.
Let µ1 „b µ. Then uspµ1paqq “ uspx¯q ě uspµ1pbqq which implies pM, sq |ùµ1 aě b. Since µ1 was an arbitrary
b variant of µ, we have pM, sq |ùµ @bpaě bq, and therefore, pM, sq |ùµ Da@bpaě bq. Bnd is valid in M; Bnd
is sound with respect to MBND.
To show completeness, we construct a canonical structure, M c. As usual the sets of states will be
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maximally consistent subsets of L, which obey the ‘L@-property.’ A set of formulae, Γ, satisfies the L@-
property if:
1. For every formula ϕ and variable a, there is some variables b such that the formula Epbq^ pϕra{bs ùñ
@aϕq is in Γ;
2. For any formulas ϕ1 . . . ϕh ph ě 0q and ψ, and every variable a that is not free in ϕ1 . . . ϕh, there is
some variable b such that the formula Ltpϕ1 ùñ . . . ùñ Ltpϕh ùñ LtpEpbq ùñ ψra{bsqq . . .q ùñ
Ltpϕ1 ùñ . . . ùñ Ltpϕh ùñ Ltpϕh ùñ @aψq . . .q is in Γ.
To this end, let Sc denote the set of all maximally AWARE YCmpYTrv consistent sets of formulae
in L that satisfy the L@-property. Let n denote an injection from X to N. For each s, define sLt “ tϕ P L |
Ltϕ P su and sAt “ ta P X | AtEpaq P su, and for each a P X , lps, aq “ tb P X | paě bq P su.
Define the canonical model M c,n “ xSc, Xc, tXcsusPS ,Vc, tRctutďT , tuc,ns usPSc , tActutďT y, where Sc is de-
fined as above, Xc “ X , Xcs “ ta P X | Epaq P su, Vc is defined by pa1 . . . an, sq P Vcpαq if and only if
αa1 . . . an P s, Rct is defined by sRcts1 if and only if sLt Ď s1, ucs “ a ÞÑ
ř
bPlps,aq
1
2npbq , and Actpsq “ sAt for
all t. Finally, define the conical assignment as the identity, µc : a ÞÑ a.
Board and Chung (2011) show that this canonically structure satisfies all AWARE Y Cmp Y Trv-
consistent formulae in the fragment of L not containing ě. Thus, we are tasked with showing that pM c, sq |ùµc
paě bq iff paě bq P s. Indeed, pM c, sq |ùµc paě bq iff uc,npaq ě uc,npbq iff řcPlps,aq 12npcq ě řcPlps,bq 12npcq , which
by Lemma 1 (and the fact that 1
2npcq ą 0 for all c P X ) is iff b P lps, aq iff paě bq P s.
Finally, we show that the same canonical construction, with the inclusion of Bnd, yields utility functions
and domains such that us|Xs attains its supremum for all s P S. Indeed, since each s P S contains Bnd.
Therefore @a @bpaě bq R s. Since s has the L@-property there is some formula Epa1q ^ ` @bpa1ě bq ùñ
@a @bpaě bq˘. By the maximal consistency Epa1q P s—hence a1 P Xs—and @bpa1ě bq P s. We claim that
uspa1q “ supbPXs uspbq. Indeed, let b1 P Xs. Then both Epb1q P s and @bpa1ě bq P s, so by E2, pa1ě b1q P s.
Finally, Lemma 1 implies that lps, b1q Ď lps, a1q and therefore that uspaq ě uspbq. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let M PMLRN , and µ be arbitrary. Assume pM, sq |ùµ L0ϕ. So, pM, s1q |ù ϕ for
all s1 P R0psq. In particular, pM, s2q |ùµ ϕ for all s2 P R1 Ď R0. By definition, pM, sq |ùµ L1ϕ. Now assume
pM, sq |ùµ A0ϕ, then for all free a in ϕ, µpaq P A0psq Ă A1psq. Therefore pM, sq |ùµ A1ϕ. Finally, assume
pM, sq |ùµ Epaq, so that µpaq P Xs, where Xs is constant on R1psq. Then pM, sq |ùµ L1Epaq. We have that
LÒ, AÒ, and LE are valid in MLRN .
Towards completeness, we construct the canonical structure, M c:LRN , as usual. The result follows if
R1psq Ď A0psq and A0psq Ď A1psq is true for all Sc:LRN . So fix some s P Sc:LRN , and let s1 be such that
sRc:LRN1 s
1. By definition this implies sL1 Ď s1. Now, let ϕ P sL0 : by definition L0ϕ P s. Since s contains
every instance of LÒ, pL0ϕ ùñ L1ϕq P s, and consequently, L1ϕ P s. By definition ϕ P sL1 Since ϕ was
arbitrary, sL0 Ď sL1 Ď s1, implying sRc:f0 s1, as desired. Now let a P sA0 so by definition A0Epaq P s. Since
s contains every instance of AÒ, pA0Epaq ùñ A0Epaqq P s, and consequently, A1Epaq P s, so a P sA1 ,
as desired. Finally, let a P Xcs , so that Epaq P s. Since s contains every instance of LE, L1Epaq P s, or,
equivalently, Epaq P sL1 . Now let s1 P R1psq; be definition Epaq P sL1 Ď s1. Therefore a P Xcs1 as desired. 
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E Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let µ be surjective. As in Lemma 2, set rss “ ts1 P S|s1 „L1 su. By the conclusion
of that lemma, there exists a set Φ Ă L be a finite set of formulae such that
h : rss ÞÑ tϕ P Φ | pM, sq |ùµ L1ϕu
is a bijection between S{„Lt and Φ.
For each state s, set xpsq P argmaxxPXsuspxq, guaranteed to exists since M P MBND. For each ϕ P Φ,
define cpϕq to be any element of ta P X | µpaq“xpsq, s P h´1pϕqu (which is non-empty by the surjectivity of
h and µ). Further, by the injectivity of h (associating tϕu – ϕ), we have that for each s, pM, sq |ùµ L1ϕ for
unique ϕ P Φ, denoted by the abuse of notation, hpsq. Thus, pc: ΦÑX qµ is indeed a contingent plan.
Also, notice that for each s, Xs must be constant on rss by LE. Moreover, for each s, s P rss “ h´1phpsqq,
implying that pM, sq |ùµ L1hpsq ^ Epcphpsqqq.
It remains to show that it is acceptable. In light of the above observation regarding existance, it suffices
to show there no state s1 such that, pM, s1q |ùµ L1hps1q ^ DaL1pa ą cphps1qq. Therefore, for some µ1 „a µ,
pM, s1q |ùµ1 L1pa ą cphps1qqq, (E.1)
Further, by the reflexivity of R1, pM, s1q |ùµ1 pa ą cphps1qqq. i.e., cphps1qq is not ěs1 maximal.
By the construction of c, there must be some other state, s2, such that cphps1qq “ xps2q and s2 P rs1s “
h´1phps1qq. Therefore, s1L1 “ s2L1 . So, by (E.1), pM, s2q |ùµ1 L1pa ą cphps1qq, a contradiction, via the
reflexivity of R1, to the us2 maximality of cphps1qq. 
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Assume this was not true for some M P M‹ and s P S. This assumption entails
that for all s1 P Rsp0q, pM, sq |ù @aA0Epaq, otherwise put, that A0ps1q “ Xs1 for all s P R0psq. Consider the
alternative model M 1 which leaved all aspects of M unchanged, except A0psq “ A1psq “ Xs for all s P S.
Then M 1 admits an (everywhere) acceptable contingent plan pc1: ΦÑX qµ. We claim that c1 is acceptable in
M at s. Indeed, we have not altered the truth value of any formula in any state s1 P R0psq: pM 1, sq |ùµ ψ
if and only if pM, sq |ùµ ψ for all ψ P L. Applying this observation to the definition of acceptability, (3.2),
concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem A.1. r2 ùñ 1s. We will prove that a Krepsian representation exists: a strictly increasing
aggregator Γ : R|R0psq| Ñ R such that
m ě m1 ðñ Γptmax
xPm us1pxqus1PR0psqq ě ΓptmaxxPm1 us1pxqus1PR0psqq (E.2)
represents ě. For each m and s, let m¯psq “ argmax us. Since ě is complete and transitive, there exists
some V : 2X Ñ R that represents it. Define ξpmq ” tmax
xPm us1pxqus1PR0psq. So let Γ be any strictly increasing
extension of the map: ξpmq ÞÑ V pmq. It remains to show that Γ is well defined. Indeed, if ξpmq “ ξpm1q, then
for all s1 P R0psq, we have us1pm¯ps1qq “ us1pm¯1ps1qq, implying (since us1 is constant over R0psq),pM, s1q |ùµ
L1
Ź
aPµ1pmqpµ1pµ´1pm¯ps1qqě aq ^ L1
Ź
aPµ´1pm1qpµ´1pm¯1ps1qqě aq. It follows that m s-dominates m1 and
that m1 s-dominates m, V pmq “ V pm1q. Now if ξpmq ą ξpm1q (i.e,. component wise inequality with some
strict), we have likewise have for all us1pm¯ps1qq ě us1pm¯1ps1qq, (with some strict preference) implying (since
us1 is constant over R0psq), pM, s1q |ù L1 ŹaPµ´1pmqpµ´1pm¯ps1qqě aq, and for at least one state s2 P R0psq,
pM, s2q |ù  L1 ŹaPµ´1pm1qpµ´1pm¯ps2qqě aq. It follows that m strictly s-dominates m1, so, V pmq ą V pm1q,
25
as desired.
r1 ùñ 2s. We will construct the model that generates ě. So let ě satisfy the axioms of Kreps (1979),
and so, the representation therein holds, (i.e., of the form of (E.2), with an arbitrary state space, Ω). It is
easy to check the following model suffices, S – Ω, V can be arbitrary, R0 “ S2, R1 “ ŤsPSps, sq, and for
each s, let usω “ uω. 
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